THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA AND
AN ARCHIPELAGIC REGIME

INTRODUCTION

The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea is
somewhat unique in the annals of international law in that it does
not seek to merely codify existing practices among nations. In
March 1976, the third session of the Conference' will attempt to
initiate or make law governing the vast expanses of the sea. One
specific issue that will be discussed is the establishment of a
regime 2 for the world's archipelagos.
The term archipelago originally referred to a broad sea (the
Aegean) interspersed with many islands. Over the course of time,
however, the land grouping itself came within the meaning of the
term.3 Although no precise definition exists due to the variety of
formations inherent in such groupings, 4 it will suffice for the purposes of this Comment to characterize an archipelago as "a formation of two or more islands which geographically may be considered
as a whole." 5
During the past fifty years, considerable controversy has taken
place concerning delineation of the legal boundaries of sea domain
for the various archipelagos and, more importantly, classification
1. Actually there have been three sessions of the Conference. The first
session, which took place in New York in 1973, was procedural in nature.
The two substantive sessions were convened in Caracas from June-August,
1974 and Geneva from March-May, 1975.
2. A regime is a form of government or administration.
3. Hodgson, Islands: Normal and Special Circumstances, in LAW OF THE
SEA: THE EMERGING REGIME OF THE OCEANS 157 (Gamble & Pontecorva eds.
1973).
4. There is a conceptual difference, for example, between coastal and
mid-ocean archipelagos. See notes 54-57 infra and accompanying text.
5. Evensen, Certain Legal Aspects Concerning the Delimitation of the
Territorial Waters of Archipelagos, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/18 (1957), reprinted in I OFFICIAL RECORDS, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF
THE SEA 289, 290 (1958).
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of waters included therein. 6 This Comment will examine the problem inherent in the question of boundary delimitations, explain the
fruitless attempts at codification of a system of rules and then
evaluate the impact of present proposals embodied in the Informal
7
Single Negotiating Text.
THE PROBLEM
In general, the territorial sea of a State is measured from the
low-water mark of the coastline, and extends to a line which at
every point is equidistant from the nearest land.8 While appropriate to a land mass with a relatively regular coastline, this method
may be impractical or dysfunctional when applied to irregular geographical circumstances.9 In that case, a system of straight baselines may be drawn. 10 It has been contended that with regard to
archipelagos the general rule is applicable, i.e., each individual island exercises jurisdiction over its own belt of territorial waters."
But a growing body of opinion recognizes that within reasonable
limits, a straight baseline method may be used to connect the outer12
most islands in the formation, until intervening waters are closed,
6. See generally O'Connell, Mid-Ocean Archipelagos in International
Law, in THE BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1

(1971).

7. This document, informal in nature, was intended to provide a meaningful basis for negotiation. It was the opinion of many participants in the
Conference that a codification of principles in this form would account for
the divergence in views without prejudice to negotiating positions. U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Part II (1975). [hereinafter cited as Negotiating
Text].
8. See Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, done at
Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, arts. 3, 6, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516
U.N.T.S. 205.
9. E.g., "In localities where the coast line is deeply indented and cut
into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity. . .

."

Id., art. 4.

10. Id.
11. The United States in particular has been a proponent of this position.
See, e.g., CAB v. Island Airlines Inc., 235 F. Supp. 990 (D. Hawaii 1964).
There was a contention, in that case, on the part of an airline in Hawaii,
that its ferrying of passengers between the islands of the chain was intrastate commerce. The federal court, recognizing United States policy in delimiting the boundaries of each island individually, concluded that the
waters lying between the islands were high seas. Therefore the airline was
subject to regulation as part of interstate commerce.
12. Klein, The TerritorialWaters of Archipelagos, 26 FED. B.J. 317 (1966).
The archipelagic nations, however, say that this should be applicable, irrespective of distance. Id. at 318.

from which the territorial sea may be measured. These baselines,
in effect, become the artificial coastline of the State.1"
Under a straight baseline approach, large portions of heretofore
open sea areas would become subject to the control of the archipelagic State.14 Not only is the extent of jurisdiction important,
but also the degree of control which that jurisdiction entails. If,
for example, archipelagic waters are considered internal, foreign
States would not be allowed access in the absence of consent.
Should the area be termed territorial sea, innocent passage would
exist' 5 but no right of overflight or submerged navigation would
be allowed without authorization."6 Any of the aforementioned
rights are allowable in areas designated as high seas.' 7 The gravamen of the problem involves the classification of waters rather than
merely the extent of jurisdiction per se. Consequently, any solutions will necessarily involve not only the permissibility of delineation by the use of baselines, but also the designation of the
contained waters.
AT'mPTS AT CODIFICATION

Claims of archipelagic unity, in order to encompass waters
outside of recognized territorial limits, are not new. In the 1890's,
a dispute arose over the classification of waters lying within the
Burmese archipelago. Burma was claiming exclusive use of the
area in order to protect indigenous oyster banks. New Zealand
pearling interests, on the other hand, contended this area was open
seas and not subject to Burmese control. In that case, the law
officers of the Crown decided that since the oyster banks were at
a greater distance from shore than the permissible territorial limits
(at that time three nautical miles from the nearest land), Burma
was precluded from exercising dominion.' 8
13. R. HODGSON & L. ALEXANDER, TOWARDS Ax OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS
SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 23 (Law of the Sea Institute, Occasional Paper
13, Kingston, R.I., 1972).

OF

No.

14. Indonesia's claim, for example, encompasses an additional 98,000
square nautical miles. STATE DEP'T BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH (Office of the Geographer), INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY STUDY-SERIES A-LIMITS
IN THE SEA, STRAIGHT BASELINES: INDONESIA, No. 35 at 1, 8 (1971).
15. Innocent passage can be described as proceeding through the territorial waters of a State without consent, so long as it is not prejudicial to
the peace, security or good order of the coastal State. Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, art.
14, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
16. E.g., id. para. 6: "Submarines are required to navigate on the surface
and to show their flag."

17. Convention on the High Seas, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T.

2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
18. O'Connell, supra note 6, at 3-4.
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In the early part of this century, a gradual shift of opinion was
discernible in favor of the establishment of an archipelagic principle. In 1924, at the 33d Conference of the International Law Association, a proposal was made by Chairman Alvarez that island
groupings should be considered a unit and territorial waters
measured from the outermost islands. 19 But by the following year,
when the final draft of articles concerning the territorial sea were
made at the Association's 34th Conference, the archipelagic provi20
sion was no longer included, without mention as to reason.
The Institute De Droit International in 1927, also discussed the
problem and a draft article was prepared. 21 In the same year,
as prestigious an international figure as Jessup, in his Law of
Territorial Waters, also lent support to archipelagic unity the2
ories.
There was, therefore, considerable impetus for the establishment
of an archipelagic regime at the Hague Codification Conference of
1930.23 At that conference it was proposed that "[i]n the case of
archipelagos, the constituent islands are considered as forming a
whole, and the width of the territorial sea shall be measured from
'' 24
the islands most distant from the center of the archipelago.
But due to a lack of consensus on the subject, and absence of
"technical details," 25 the separate provision for archipelagos was
abandoned. 20 It is worthy of note that there was some support
for a ten nautical mile maximum distance for baselines connecting
the islands. This was in conformity with established rules on the
27
applicable length of closing lines for bays.
19.

REPORT OF THE

TION, STOCKHOLM

20.

33D

CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW

AssocIA-

259 et seq. (1924).

REPORT OF THE 34TH CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AssocIA-

TION, VIENNA 40 et seq. (1926).
21. Comment, The Problems of Delimitations of Baselines for Outlying

Archipelagos,9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 733, 737 (1972).
22.

P. JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDIC-

TION 457 (1927).

23. "The Codification Conference was appointed by the League of Nations in 1924 to prepare a conference for the codification of international
law." Comment, supra note 21, at 738 n.20.
24. 8 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. 70, 72 (1927).
25. Among the "technical details" referred to were (1) distances between
islands in the archipelagos and (2) amount of water to be encompassed
by the territorial sea extending outward from the formation. Id. at 51.
26. Evensen, supra note 5, at 292.
27. Closing lines are used to connect the headlands of a bay, from which

In 1951, the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) handed down
an opinion which was to have a significant impact on the claims
of archipelagic nations, the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case.28 At
stake was valuable fisheries area off the coast of Norway and the
court was called upon by the parties to decide the validity of the
lines of delimitation that Norway was claiming as its coastline.
The method used was straight baselines, connecting the outermost
islets and rocks on the island fringe on Norway's west coast, known
as "skjaergaard.

' '29

Several important questions were presented for resolution of
problem. The first one was whether the technique of straight baselines applied to island formations as Norway claimed. The court
answered affirmatively, stating that although originally designed
for jagged coasts, the inter fauces terrarum0 character of the
skjaergaard was amenable to the straight baseline approach.
Second, if straight baselines were to be deemed a legitimate
method of delimitation, what was to be the recognizable length of
the individual line segments? Britain, following the seed planted
in the Hague Codification Conference, analogized the situation to
that of bays, where ten nautical mile closing lines had been used.
The court, rather than imposing a rigid maximum distance, allowed
lines up to 42 nautical miles long. Instead of a specific distance,
various criteria were espoused for determining the reasonableness
of a baseline. One important factor is the dependence of the territorial sea on the land domain. There must be sufficient flexibility
to account for idiosyncratic characteristics of the region without
departing from the general direction of the coast.
Concomitant with that requirement, it must also be established
that the areas of sea to be enclosed are "sufficiently closely linked"
with the land domain so as to be considered internal waters. And
finally, it must be shown that the baseline delineation is a necessary
adaptation to the local conditions.
These prerequisites having been satisfied, the I.C.J. concluded
that the Norwegian baselines were fair and reasonable. In addition,
however, the decision also pointed to an historic claim to the disputed area. Since 1869, Norway had continuously asserted, and the
the territorial sea may be measured. The issue of closing lines is relevant
to the question of archipelagos because it represents a criterion for the maximum distance allowable to connect land areas. See generally R.HODaSON
&L. ALEXANDER, supranote 13.
28. [1951] I.C.J. 116.
29. Literally, a skjaergaard means "rock rampart." Id. at 128.
30. The term means "within the jaws of land," and implies an intimate
connection between land and water domain.
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international community had tolerated, the exclusive control of the
area within the skjaergaard.
The result, therefore, was that Norway was entitled to the use
of straight baselines connecting the outermost points of the formation. As will be seen, this decision was hailed by the archipelagic
States in subsequent forums,3 1 and used to justify unilateral assertions of sovereignty. It will also be shown that the Fisheries case
differs in marked degree from the claims of those nations.
During the 1950's, a resolution of the problem of archipelagic
boundary determination was as elusive as ever. The International
Law Commission did not give extensive treatment to the issue, although it did examine the possibility of using a "fictive bay"
analysis and a ten nautical mile maximum for baselines. 32 Predictably, however, the lack of agreement on the length of baselines
led to a deletion of the article,3 3 the criticism of some members
notwithstanding.
The Geneva Conference of 195834 did not, in fact, take up the
specific question of archipelagos, although initiatives were made by
the Philippines 35 and Yugoslavia. 36 When it is kept in mind that
no agreement could be reached at that conference for the breadth
of the territorial sea, omission of the more expansive and difficult
questions regarding archipelagos is understandable.
A second Law of the Sea Conference convened two years later
for the specific purpose of establishing the breadth of the territorial
sea. At this gathering the Philippines tried to extricate itself from
the predictable effects on its claims should a specific breadth be
31. See, e.g., Statement of Mr. Nandan (Fiji) before Subcommittee II of
the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/
SC.II/SR.53, at 65 (1973).
32. YEARBOOK OF THE INT'L LAW Com mssIoN 217 (1955).
33. Id. at 195.
34. The results of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
were embodied in four conventions; the High Seas, Territorial Waters
and Contiguous Zone, Continental Shelf, and Fisheries.
35. The suggested Philippine addition to article ten was
[w]hen islands lying off the coast are sufficiently close to one another as to form a compact whole and have been historically considered collectively as a single unit, they may be taken in their
totality and the method of straight baselines provided in Article 5
may be applied to determine their territorial Sea. O'Connell, supra
note 6, at 20.
36. Id.

agreeable to the world community. It proposed, therefore, that no
territorial water delimitation would be applicable to its "historic
waters." 37 Though this proposal was rejected, 38 the issue became
moot when the members of the Conference once again failed, this
time by one vote, to agree on a territorial sea breadth.
UNILATERAL CLAIMS

"The delimitation of sea areas necessarily is always international
in scope. It cannot be dependent merely30 upon the will of the
coastal State expressed in municipal law.1

In light of the singular failure of international organizations to
establish a regime for archipelagos, however, it is not surprising
that several archipelagic States acted unilaterally during the latter
part of the 1950's. The reasonableness of those claims with respect
to competing interests must be subjected to careful scrutiny.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the problems related
to the establishment of an archipelagic regime are not solely geographic in nature; there are economic, political, environmental and
military ramifications as well.40 Underlying it all, "the extension
of jurisdiction involved raises problems with regard to one of the
most fundamental principles of contemporary law of the sea, i.e.,
the freedom of navigation, and the existence thereof in archipelagic
41

waters."1

Several arguments may be marshalled in defense of archipelagic
unity. First, it is asserted that an economic interdependency
between land and water exists to a greater degree than with most
continental States. Inter-island travel and communication depends
upon the unhampered use of intervening waters. 42 Fishing within
the archipelago is of enormous importance and the impact of pollution on that major industry would have extraordinary conse43

quences.

37. Id. This took the form of an amendment to a proposal excluding
the applicability of any provisions of the territorial sea regime relating to
historic waters.
38. The vote was 39 to 36, with 13 abstentions. OFFICIAL RECORDS, SECOND
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 151 (1960).

39. [1951] I.C.J. 116, 132.
40. Statement of Senator A. Tolentino,
E.NCE ON THE LAW OF THE

SECOND UNITED NATIoNs CONFER-

SEA 70, 75 (1960)

(verbatim Record of the Com-

mittee of the Whole).
41. Kusumaatmadja, The Legal Regime of Archipelogos: Problems and
Issues, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: NEEDS AND INTERESTS OF DEVELOPING
CouNTRIEs 166-67 (Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Conference of the

Law of the Sea Institute, 1972).

42. See generally A. CUTSHALL, THE PHILIPPINES 84 et seq. (1964).
43. Kusumaatmadja, supra note 41, at 166.
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In addition, there are several political considerations. Stability
in the State could be undermined should anyone desiring to promote unrest be given freedom of mobility within archipelagic
waters. And the prevalence of smuggling, already a threat to the
political and economic stability of certain States, would be44likely
to increase if sanctuaries are available within the archipelago.
It is for some or all of the foregoing reasons that countries such
as Indonesia, Mauritius, Ecuador (with regard to the Galapagos
Islands) and the Philippines have claimed extended jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the arguments militating against the unity theory are
not insubstantial. 45 Archipelagos have historically been shown to
be a fertile ground for world-wide fishing interests. The waters
contained within archipelagos provide vital conduits for commercial
transportation to many parts of the world.4 6 Finally, the military
importance of sea and air mobility between strategic areas cannot
be overlooked.

47

To further elucidate these conflicting interests, the claims of the
archipelagic nations of Indonesia and the Philippines, the two
major proponents of an archipelagic regime, are examined in detail.
The Indonesian archipelago consists of over 13,000 islands, 3,000
of which are inhabited. 48 This formation, in its distribution of
area, is approximately 3,000 nautical miles 49at its greatest length,
and 1,300 nautical miles at its greatest width.
Indonesia's claim was asserted by the Council of Ministers
December 13, 1957. It stated:
The waters around, between and connecting the islands or parts
of islands belonging to the Indonesian archipelago, irrespective of

44. Grandison & Meyer, International Straits, Global Communications

and the Evolving Law of the Sea, 8 VAm. J. TRNS. L. 393, 421 (.1975).
45. M. McDouGAL & W. BuRaE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF = OcEANs 412
(1962).

46. See generally Kennedy, A Brief Geographical and Hydrographical
Study of Straits Which Constitute Routes for InternationalTraffic, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.13/6 & Add.1 (1957).
47. See, e.g., Statement of the Soviet representative to Subcommittee II

of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (more commonly referred to as

the Seabed Committee), U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.6, at 18 (1971).
48. McConnell, The Legal Regime of Archipelagoes, 35 SAsK. L. REV. 121
(1970).
49. Klein, supranote 12.

their width or dimension, are natural appurtenances of its land
territory, and therefore an integral part of the inland or national
waters subject to the absolute sovereignty of Indonesia.60

To put this in terms of extent of control, the entire baseline system
surrounding the archipelago is 8,167 nautical miles and encloses
over 666,000 square nautical miles of sea.5 ' As stated in the proclamation above, this entire area is considered to be subject to the
regime of internal waters. The area enclosed by the baseline system is estimated at three and one-half times the amount of sea
enclosed without baseline construction. 2 Further, it should be
noted that some lines range up to 124 nautical miles in length.68
As stated previously, Indonesia supports the validity of its
baseline construction in part on the basis of the Fisheries decision.
This raises the question of the precedental value of the Fisheries
case with respect to the situation of Indonesia. To answer that
question a comparison must be made between coastal and mid-ocean
archipelagos.
A coastal archipelago is one in which an island grouping or fringe
is so closely associated with a land mass as to be considered part
of it.54 This is in contrast to the mid-ocean variety, which are
formations without connection to a continental land mass." In
analyzing the Fisheriescase it is important that the distinction be
kept in mind.
The I.C.J. was presented with a configuration in which over
120,000 islands, islets and bare rock dotted the waters adjacent to
the Norwegian coast. In the words of the court, "[t] he coast of
the mainland does not constitute, as it does in most countries, a
clear dividing line between land and sea. It is the edge of the
skjaergaardwhich really constitutes the coast." 56
In the context of the unique situation before it, the court in the
Fisheries case took cognizance of the fact that, in all practical
respects, the archipelago formation was part of the Norwegian
coastline, and therefore upheld the validity of the use of baselines.
No such consideration is present in the case of mid-ocean archipelagos. The Fisheries case, for that reason, cannot be said to stand
50. Reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.19/51 Add.l, at 3-4 (1960).
supra note 14, at 8.

51. STATE DF'T BuREAU OF INTLIGENCE RFSARC,
52. Id.

53. By comparison, the longest baseline drawn in the Fisheries case was

42 nautical miles. R.HoDGsoN & L. ALEXANDER, supra note 13, at 42.
54. Evensen, supranote 5, at 290.

55. Id.

56. [1951] I.C.J. 116, 127 (emphasis added).
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for the proposition that all island groupings may employ baseline

construction.
Assuming that the technique of baseline construction is applicable, the assertions of Indonesia and other archipelagic states fail

on substantive grounds. In its opinion, the I.C.J. stressed the requirement of water being "sufficiently closely linked" with the land

domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters. 57 The vast
expanses of sea enclosed by the Indonesians cannot realistically be

characterized as analogous to rivers, bays and other traditional
examples of internal waters.
A second basis for asserting a straight baseline enclosure of
58
archipelagic waters is the peculiar vulnerability of the nation.
For example, studies on the impact of pollution in the Straits of
Malacca due to oil spills revealed serious resulting consequences to
Indonesian communities who rely on those waters as a food source.
Indonesia, therefore, in conjunction with Malaysia and Singapore,
claimed a right to control tanker traffic in this area in 1971. 59
There is a legitimate interest here, but legitimacy of the action
depends not only upon Indonesian interests, but also the interests
of the world community. This strait is an important link between
Middle East oil fields and Japanese industry.6 0 It has been estimated that should a threatened restriction on oil tanker transit
become a reality, the cost of oil would increase approximately $22
per barrel. 61 The implications of this rise in price are international in scope, due to the accompanying rise in the cost of
Japanese products.
The resolution of this problem of conflicting interest is not easy.
The point, however, is that solutions to international problems
57. The inquiry cannot end at this point. Further distinction must be
made as to the applicability of an innocent passage regime or the less rigorous rules of transit passage.
58. The Indonesian government has blamed a decline in their fishing industry on the transit of supertankers in its waters. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/
SC.II/SR.31, at 111-12 (1972).
59. Leiffer & Nelson, Conflict of Interest in the Straits of Malacca, 49
INT'L AFF. 190, 195 (1972).

60. Japan receives 80 percent of its oil from the Middle East. See Grandison &Meyer, supra note 44, at 417.
61. Miller, Indonesia's Archipelago Doctrine and Japan'sJugular, in U.S.
NAVAL INSTITUTE PEOcEEDINGS 26 (Oct 1972).

cannot legitimately be grounded on unilateral action, even though
well intentioned.
Philippine claims to areas of the sea as part of its sovereign
territory make Indonesian claims pale by comparison. The Philippine archipelago consists of 7,104 islands (800 are inhabited),02 and
occupies an area which, at its greatest length and width, is 1,152
nautical miles by 688 nautical miles.6 3 The baseline system employed differs from that of other archipelagic nations insofar as
04
it rests, to some degree, upon historic grounds.
In notes verbales sent to the International Law Commission in
195565 and 1956,66 the Philippines claimed vast areas of the

Pacific and South China Sea, in addition to waters lying within
the archipelago. The second note verbale, dated January 20, 1956,
states:
All waters around, between and connecting different islands belonging to the Philippines Archipelago, irrespective of their width
or dimension, are necessary appurtenances of its land territory,
forming an integral part of the national or inland waters, subject
to the exclusive sovereignty of the Philippines. All other water
areas embraced within the lines described in the Treaty of Paris
of 10 December 1898, the Treaty concluded at Washington D.C.
between the United States and Spain on 7 November 1900, the
Agreement between the United States and Great Britain, as reproduced in section 6 of the Commonwealth Act No. 4003 and
article 1 of the Philippines Constitution, are considered as maritime territorial waters of the Philippines .. . without prejudice
to the exercise by friendly foreign vessels of the right of innocent passage over those waters.67

There are two areas of this claim which must be examined. The

first deals with the sufficiency of the claim to a categorization of
"inland" waters.68 The interests to be protected here by the
Philippines are those previously invoked on behalf of Indonesia,
i.e., economic dependency, security and political unity. The countervailing interests, in this case, are the mobility of military forces,

as espoused by the United States and the Soviet Union, 0 and
unhampered international commerce.
62. Dellapenna, The PhilippinesTerritorial Water Claim in Internationa
Law, 5 J. In'rL L. & EcoN. 45,46 (1970).

63. STATE DEP'T BUREAU OF INTELIGENCE RESEARcH (Office of the Geographer), INTEPNATIONAL BOUNDARY STUdY-SEmRIs A-Lnmrrs 3N THE SEA,
STRAIGHT BASELINES: TiE PHLiPPINEs,

64. See C. CoLoMBos,

No. 33 at 8 (1971).
OF THE SEA 122 (6th ed. 1967).

LNTERNATIONAL LAW

65. Reprinted in 10 U.N. GAOR Supp. 9, at 36 (1955).
66. Reprinted in Dellapenna, supra note 62, at 47.
67. Id.
68. The term "inland waters," for the purposes of this discussion, is
synonymous with internal waters.
69. The Soviet Union favors a preservation of "customary rights" in these
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One of the areas claimed by this country as inland waters is the
Sulu Sea, covering an area of roughly 86,000 square nautical
miles. 70 Baselines cutting off this area are approximately 140
nautical miles long. Much of this archipelagic nation's economy
rests upon fishing in -the area.71 Additionally, the Philippines has
constantly been plagued by smuggling in the more remote areas
of the domain. The exclusion of foreign vessels in the area, therefore, is of substantial importance to the government.
As stated above, the interests to be protected in the Philippine
archipelago by other nations is that of free transit, including the
rights of submerged navigation and overflight. 72 The closing of
these waters could, for example, make it more difficult and costly
for American naval forces in the South Pacific (e.g., New Zealand)
to reach Southeast Asia. 73 World travel could also be seriously
impaired by the cutting off of East/West air routes in the central
74
Pacific.
Japan especially would be adversely affected by the categorization of waters as inland, since this precludes even customary rights
of innocent passage. Exclusion from these routes of travel dramatically increases the cost of transportation of goods, and ultimately
75
the prices of those goods.
The other aspect of the Philippines' claim which warrants
attention is that portion of the notes verbales dealing with an
"historic claim." This additional area of asserted jurisdiction is, in
some places, 285 nautical miles from the nearest land, thereby mak76
ing it the most extravagant of seaward claims.
areas. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.58, at 7 (1973). For the position of
the United States, which envisions international regulation of transit, see
statement of Mr. J. Stevenson before Subcommittee I of the Seabed
Committee, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.7, at 26 (1972).
70. Dellapenna, supra note 62, at 47.
71. CUTSHALL, supra note 42, at 8.

72. On the importance of the mobility of U.S. submarines, see Cohen, The
Erosionof Surface Naval Power,49 FOPIGN AFFAms 330 (1971).
73. Wilkes, The Use of World Resources Without Conflict: Myths About
the TerritorialSea, 14 WAx-E L. REV. 441 (1968).
74. Id. at 466.
75. Grandison &Meyer, supranote 44, at 417.
76. Dellapenna, supra note 62, at 48. This outdistances even the 200-mile
claims of Chile, Ecuador and Peru. See U.N. Doc A/AC.138/80, at 16

(1972).

Two justifications for the claim are put forth. The first is the
description of boundaries in treaties, and the second is the Fisheries
case. The Treaty of Paris at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War ceded all territories consolidated by Spain to the United
States. 77 In order to avoid the necessity of naming each island
individually, the parties delineated coordinates on a map, within
which all land was transferred. It is the contention of the Philip78
pines that these coordinates circumscribed the nation as a whole.
Consequently, when the Philippines acquired its independence
from the United States in 1946, the area in question devolved to
its control. The problem with this contention is that the documents
purport to give land expressly within the coordinates, not area.1 9
The second attempt at justification is equally untenable. In the
Fisheries case, Norway's claim to the area in question dated back
almost 80 years, and the court emphasized this "long usage."'80 The
Philippines' claim, by contrast, dates at best from 1955, as no mention of it can be found prior to that time. The United States had
not made any such claim during the time of its possession of the
archipelago. The intent to exclude is not greeted with toleration
or acquiescence by the world community. The United States, for
example, specifically rejects the contention81 and the submerged
navigation of the Triton through the Suriago Strait and the Mindanao Sea particularly illustrates this point.82 The Philippines
counters the argument by asserting that the voyage of the Triton
was within the broad grant of consent embodied in the Agreement
between the two nations concerning military bases. 88 But the
Triton's voyage was a circumnavigation of the globe, not a visit
to an American base in the Philippines. Therefore, the American
position appears to be stronger.
It seems, at any rate, that unilateral attempts at establishing an
archipelagic regime have not been wholly satisfactory. The impact
77. For an extensive explanation of the Philippines historical claim, see

statement of Senator A. Tolentino, supra note 40.
78. Id.

79. O'Connell, supranote 6, at 27.

80. [1951] I.C.J. 116, 133.
81. Klein, supra note 12, at 320.
82. Dellapenna, supra note 62, at 51.

83. Article four of the Agreement states:

It is mutually agreed that United States public vessels operated by
or for the war or Navy Departments, the Coast Guard or the Coast
and Geodetic Survey, and the military forces of the United States,
military and naval aircraft and the Government-owned vehicles,
including armor, shall be accorded free access to and movement
between ports and United States bases throughout the Philippines ....
61 Stat. 4019, T.I.A.S. 1775.
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of present negotiations in the law of the sea, to some extent, has
84
been to alleviate some of the problems engendered by them.
OTHM

CLAIMS OF ExTFwDED JURISDICTiON

In 1945, an event occurred which was to have a profound impact
on the law of the sea. That was a proclamation by President
Truman, extending national jurisdiction to the resources of the continental shelf out to a depth of 200 meters.85 This claim, it should
be noted, was not an extension of American boundaries per se; its
purpose was to create and preserve a right on the part of the
United States to explore and exploit the seabed resources, particularly oil, off its shores.
Other nations, picking up on the theme espoused by America, also
began making claims of extended jurisdiction. These new claims,
however, were not necessarily confined to resources in the seabed.
One important example of a variation on the American theme was
the Declaration of Santiago, made by the nations of Chile, Ecuador
and Peru. 86 That document purported to vest sovereign rights to
an exclusive economic zone (primarily for the protection of fisheries) in an area extending 200 nautical miles seaward of the South
American continental mass. This in turn led to an inexorable push
for unilateral claims of extension by many nations in the 1950's
not only to economic zones but territorial
and 1960's, with regard
87
jurisdiction as well.
In a speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations
in 1967, Mr. Arvid Pardo voiced a concern over the proliferation
of claims to the use of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction.
While noting the great potential of wealth to be derived therefrom,
his central concern was that the ocean floor would be appropriated
84. See, e.g., classification of archipelagic waters, infra note 95.
85. Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to

the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Seabed of the Continental Shelf,
Sept. 28, 1945; 59 Stat. 884.

86. Agreements between Chile, Ecuador and Peru, signed at the First

Conference on the Exploitation and Conservation of the Maritime Resources

of the South Pacific, Santiago, Aug. 18, 1952, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/80 (1955).
87. See generally STATE DEPT. BUREAu oF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH, (Office of the Geographer), INTERNATIONAL BouNDARY STuDY-SERiEs ALuviTs IN THE SEA, NATIONAL CLAIMS TO MIARITIME JURISDIcTION, No. 36 (rev.
1973).

by the major Cold War powers for military purposes (such as submerged missile sites).88 To deal with this problem, he proposed the
-establishment of a committee under United Nations auspices.8 9 As
a result, the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the
Seabed and Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction
was organized.9 0 This committee grew in the ensuing years, becoming a permanent United Nations committee which decided that
a law of the sea conference was necessary to resolve many of
the issues relating to national jurisdiction. The Third United
Nations Conference on -the Law of the Sea was then set for 1973,
with preparatory sessions beginning in 1970.91 One of the specific
problems on the agenda was the classification and extent of waters
92
to be encompassed by an archipelagic regime.
At the first session of the Conference in Caracas, draft proposals
were submitted by the interested nations. As with many other substantive issues, a wide divergence of opinion regarding the archipelagic regime was apparent. Therefore "[a]t its 55th plenary

meeting on Friday 18 April 1975, the Conference decided to request
the Chairmen of its three Main Committees each to prepare a single

negotiating text covering the subjects entrusted to his Committee."9 3 This document was to provide a basis for negotiation, incorporating, as much as possible, .the positions of the interested
parties.94
THE IromAL SINGL

NEGOTATnG TEXT

Part VII of the Second Committee's Negotiating Text deals specifically with archipelagic states. It defines one as
a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting
waters and other natural features which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural features form
88. U.N. Doe. A/AC.I/P.V.1515, at 6 (1967).
89. Kildow, The Law of the Sea: Alliances and Divisive Issues in International Ocean Negotiations,11 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 558, 561 (1974).
90. G.A. Res. 2340 (XXLL), Report of the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction, Vol. 1, No. 21 (A/9021), at 1 (1973).
91. G.A. Res. 2750C, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 26 (1970).
92. U.N. Doc. SC.II/WG/Paper No. 4, at 3 et seq. (1970).
93. Note by the President of the Conference, Negotiating Text, supra note
7, at 1.
94. The aim of the Conference in adopting the new method for the
future stage of its work would have been defeated had all trends
been retained in this text. It was possible to amalgamate some of
the alternative formulations but in other cases it was necessary
to choose between conflicting proposals. In certain cases, a middle
course was adopted. Id. at 2.
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an intrinsic geographic, economic and political entity, or which
historically have been regarded as such.95
In order to establish the entity described above, a method of
straight baselines may be used.9 6 There are, however, two restrictions for the drawing of these baselines. First, the area of water
contained inside the baselines cannot exceed that of the land
domain by a greater ratio than 9:1. Secondly, the prescribed maximum for baseline length is 80 nautical miles, but a certain percentage of the total number of lines (undetermined at present) may
be longer, up to a maximum of 125 nautical miles97
Both of these criteria weigh heavily in favor of the archipelagic
states. They not only acknowledge the applicability of a straight
baseline delineation of boundaries, but also give tremendous flexibility by their generous terms.98 When it is remembered that, in
addition to encompassing archipelagic waters, these lines are also
used to measure the breadth of the territorial sea, contiguous zone
and exclusive economic zone, the huge expanses of sea capable of
enclosure become apparent. 99
The term "archipelagic waters" is ostensibly a compromise designation. Whereas archipelagic nations favor a categorization of
waters as internal, major maritime powers have fought for increased
navigational rights. This distinct categorization of waters within
the baselines, when taken in conjunction with other important provisions in the Text, seems to have combined the essential arguments
of the polar views into a workable formula. Preliminary to an
analysis of provisions dealing with the archipelagic waters, there95. This alteration in the wording contrasts markedly from its forerunners (e.g., Evensen, supra note 5). This definition distinguishes archipelagic status, for whom the provisions are applicable, and other island
groupings i.e., coastal archipelagos and mid-ocean chains belonging to a
coastal State (e.g., Hawaii).
96. Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. 118, at 42.
97. This would seem to preclude some lines drawn by the Philippines,
which are up to 140 nautical miles in length. This maximum distance, however, is negotiable, and there is a possibility it will be increased to accommodate the Philippines.
98. Hodgson, supra note 3, at 164. The author there suggests that a maximum ratio of 5:1 would be appropriate to ensure a close relationship between water and land. See also R. HoDasoN & L. ALEXANDER, supra note
13, at 42, with regard to baseline length.
99. See note 14 supra.

fore, it will first be necessary to examine the relevance of the
classification of other sea areas.
Within the area designated archipelagic waters, the archipelagic
State may, in accordance with the provisions of the Text, draw closing lines for the delineation of internal waters.100 Although this
classification only refers to rivers emptying in the sea, bays, and
permanent harbor works, it still allows a small measure of security
to the archipelagic state. Moreover, when this provision is viewed
in the context of the other elements of the archipelagic regime (e.g.,
the exclusive economic zone), it will not have as drastic effect on
archipelagic interests as might first appear to be the case.
Outside the area delineated as archipelagic waters, the territorial
sea, extending twelve nautical miles from the baseline system, is
characterized by the traditionally recognized right of innocent
passage. 1 1 As stated previously, innocent passage allows for the
expeditious traversing of the territorial sea without consent, so long
as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the
coastal State. The Text may also vest a great deal of power and
discretion in the coastal State as to what is to be considered innocent.102 Submerged navigation and overflight here, as with internal water, is prohibited..0 3

This belt of water surrounding the

archipelagic formation acts as a protective buffer between archipelagic waters and the outlying areas of exclusive economic zone and
high seas.
An exception to this general categorization of rights in the
territorial sea is the right of transit passage in straits used for international navigation.10 4 This concept is germane to the topic of
archipelagos even though it applies to waters outside the straight
baselines because it affects interests within (e.g., pollution problems). Transit passage entitles foreign ships and aircraft freedom
of navigation and overflight, respectively, in transversing a strait
100. Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. 121, at 43.

101. See id. arts. 14-21.
102. Article 16(2) provides in part "[p]assage of a foreign ship shall be

considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the

coastal state, if it engages in . . . [certain enumerated activities and] ...
any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage." Id. art. 16, at
8-9. Although it is unclear at this time the activities included within this
provision, it is certainly going to be construed literally by the archipelagic
States.
103. Id. art. 17, at 9.
104. Id. art. 38(2), at 16. This is in marked contrast to the provision
for innocent passage in the 1958 Convention. See Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, done at Geneva, April 29, 1958, art. 16,
15 U.S.T. 1606, T.IA.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
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which is completely enveloped by territorial sea. It would seem,

therefore, that maritime interests have acquired a valuable concession in favor of international communication.

But this right is

subject to several conditions. The right is only assertable when
transit is from one area of the high seas or economic zone to another
area of high seas or economic zone. 10 5 Any strait not conforming
to this condition is subject to "other provisions", i.e., innocent
passage. This condition would, in effect, retain the provision for

straits embodied in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea,
which allowed for innocent passage to and from the territorial sea

of a foreign state. Moreover, if another route of "similar convenience" exists in either an exclusive economic zone or high seas,

ships traveling through the strait will only be entitled to innocent
passage. 10 6
Another important element of the provision on straits is the

power given -tothe strait State to promulgate regulations concerning
safety of navigation, and other interests. 10 7 It was just this type
of regulation which was attempted in the Straits of Malacca mentioned above.' 0 8 It would appear then, that transit passage is not
as free as it might first appear and could pose a serious stumbling
block in the negotiations. The archipelagic States are given a modicum of control here, but if viewed in the totality of provisions in
the new archipelagic regime, it is not insubstantial.
The contiguous zone, up to 24 nautical miles from the baselines
described above, is designed to allow the coastal State to prevent
and punish the infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations of a coastal State in that area.10 9 Originally this
concept was designed to prevent smuggling and other illicit activities just outside the territorial waters of a State, and for this reason
With the
was embodied in the 1958 Geneva Convention.'"
advent of exclusive economic zone theory and the powers given
105. Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. 37, at 15.

106. Id. art. 36, at 15.
107. This includes; a) safety of navigation, b) prevention of pollution, c)
prevention of fishing, etc. Id. art. 41, at 17.
108. See notes 59-61 supra.
109. Negotiating Text, supranote 7, art. 33, at 14.
110. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, done at
Geneva, April 29, 1958, art. 24, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.LA.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S.

205.

coastal States with regard to policing that area, the concept of a
contiguous zone, to a great extent, will have outlived its usefulness.'1 1 In any event,, it is at least theoretically beneficial to
the archipelagic State to have such a zone as an added protection
against infringements upon its sovereignty.
Probably the most fundamental change in the law of the sea
which the United Nations Conference is seeking to achieve is that
dealing with an expanse of water extending seaward a distance of
200 nautical miles, known as the exclusive economic zone. Basically,
this concept involves an exercise of national jurisdiction for the
purpose of establishing an exclusive right to resources (both living
and nonliving) within that area. 1 2 It is relevant to the questions relating to a regime for archipelagos in three respects.
The first point of interest is that it renders moot the perennial
problem of the delineation of baselines, insofar as they relate to
economic interests within the archipelagic waters. Even in the
absence of a strait baseline approach, a separate economic zone for
each island (including areas of overlapping zones) would be more
than enough to encompass the entire area of intervening waters. A
major archipelagic concern, economic dependence on these waters,
is thereby alleviated.
To a somewhat lesser extent, the concept of an economic zone
also lessens much of the force of arguments regarding areas outside
the straight baselines. A distinct zone for each individual island
would encompass much of the area which now comes under archipelagic control with the use of straight baselines. Therefore, at
least with respect to economic interests, the long-standing issue of
baselines seems to have lost much of its controversial character.
Secondly, the economic zone provides for coastal State exclusivity in the area of resources." 3 Archipelagic States will have this
111. Aguilar, The Patrimonial Sea or Economic Zone Concept, 11 SAN
,Dico L. Rzv. 579, 597 (1974).
112. See generally Johnson & Gold, The Economic Zone in the Law of
the Sea: Survey Analysis of Current Trends, in THE LAw or no SEA: Nsms
AND INoTS
oF DEvELoPING CouNRms 7 (Proceedings of the Seventh
Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, 1972).
113. Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. 48 providing for exclusive rights
to construction of offshore facilities, scientific research, allowable catch of
living resources etc.
The Negotiating Text also provides that there should be an optimum utilization of the zone. Where full utilization is not realizable by the coastal
State, foreign States may be allowed access consistent with the national interests of the coastal State. In practice, however, the coastal State will be
able to effectively exclude outside interests under the broad grants of power
discussed herein.
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interest protected and, in addition, will receive the benefit of a protective buffer for living resources within the archipelago itself.
Migratory species of fish indigenous to archipelagic waters will not
be as susceptible to foreign fishing fleets outside the archipelago,
due to the greater distances involved.
Finally, the economic zone will, in all likelihood, contribute to
the domestic security of the archipelagic State. Article 60 provides
in part:
The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to
explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the
exclusive economic zone, take such measures, including boarding
inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary

it
to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations enacted by
14
in conformity with the provisions of the present Convention.'
The ramifications of this statement are considerable when it is
remembered that certain undesirable activities, smuggling for example, are largely centered in that area just outside coastal State
jurisdiction. Power to board, inspect and arrest in this zone should,
to a substantial degree, have a deterrent effect.
As for the archipelagic waters itself, nowhere is the dilemma of
choosing between competing interests more apparent. In economic
terms, the archipelagic States have succeeded in preserving a unified whole. And although the interests in security are in great
measure supported by various other provisions in the area of archipelagic waters, security interests defer, to some extent, to the competing claims of the world community. The principal focus here
is upon the issue of passage. Article 123 of the Negotiating Text
states: "Subject to the provisions of Article 124, ships of all States,
whether coastal or not, shall enjoy the right of innocent passage
through archipelagic waters."" 15
This position undeniably favors the economic interests of the
world's sea powers as it allows for international shipping. But
although this provision undercuts the claims of States desiring the
categorization of such waters as internal, it is not inconsistent with
the actual practice of those States. 116 The article also includes
114.
115.
116.
today.

Id. at 25.
Id. at 43.
In effect, innocent passage is the prevailing practice in these waters
Dellaperma, supra note 62, at 48-49. But their categorization as in-

the power to suspend innocent passage when necessary to protect
the State's "security"11 7-a rather encompassing phrase-which
helps to preserve the interest in having secure waters.
The Negotiating Text then purports further to erode archipelagic
security interests with a rather large exception to the regime of
innocent passage. This is called the right of "sealanes passage."" 8
Sealanes passage is to archipelagic waters what transit passage is
to the territorial sea. The archipelagic State may (not "will") designate sealanes and air routes in its water "for the safe, continuous
and expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft .... ",,110
On the other hand, there is also a provision that if no such sealanes or air routes are designated, "passage may be exercised
120
through the routes normally used for international navigation.'
The import of sealanes passage obviously favors the maritime
powers. Rights of submerged passage and overflight, long contended a sine qua non of the negotiations (at least as far as the
United States was concerned),121 is thereby established, even
without archipelagic State approval.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, all is not one-sided in sealanes
passage. The exception is subject to qualifications of its own. For
example, a restricting feature of the provision is that it applies only
to transit between one part of the high seas or economic zone and
another part of the high seas or economic zone. 22 In excluding
the right of sealanes passage to or from the territorial sea or inland
ternal implies that passage is predicated upon consent rather than right.
Therefore, the new regime is necessary to guarantee these rights.
117. Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. 123 (2), at 43.
118. Id. art. 124, at 43-44.
119. Id.

120. Id. This is a reference to those routes established by State practice,

See note 116 supra. But these provisions are couched so that additional
sealanes are not introduced without archipelagic State approval.

121. This is equitable with the United States position on international

straits. See, e.g., Statement of Leigh Ratiner (Chairman of the Defense
Advisory Group on the Law of the Sea) at the Hearings on Territorial Sea
Boundaries, before the Subcomm. on Seapower of the House Comm. on

Armed Services, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 9291 (1970).

Indicative of the

strong stand the United States would take should movement of its military
forces be restricted, he said:
We do not recognize the 12-mile territorial sea, and it is doubtful
that if we fail to obtain the necessary protection through international straits at a conference, that we could accept the territorial
sea. We would as a matter of high national security priority have
to maintain that we are only bound to recognize the 3-mile
limit ....
Id.
122. Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. 124(3), at 44. This is consistent
with a similar provision dealing with international straits. See note 104
supra.
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waters of a foreign State, the drafters minimized the number of
areas subject to this regime. Presumably, only the regime of innocent passage would then be applicable.
An additional mitigating factor favoring archipelagos is the
retained ability on the part of the archipelagic State to promulagte
regulations which would protect key concerns. Illustrative of this
point is article 125 which provides, in part, a restriction on "the
taking on board or putting overboard of any commodity, currency
or person in contravention of the customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary regulations of the archipelagic State.' 23 Compliance
124
should
with these regulations, mandated in the same article,
serve to counterbalance the sway in favor of the maritime, developed States.
CONCLUSION

In this analysis of the status of archipelagos at the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, two central questions
have been addressed. The first deals with the extent of archipelagic jurisdiction through the establishment of a system of straight
baselines. Probably of greater importance, though, is the second
question-the various classifications of waters in the delineated
areas. These classifications necessarily relate to the competing
interests of the developed maritime States and the developing
archipelagic States.
After decades of debate and disagreement concerning the status
of archipelagos, the Informal Single Negotiating Text has provided
a regime. The history of the dispute, from the early 1900's, through
several international conferences and up to the present, might, at
first, lead one to conclude that this formulation of rules is also
doomed. Several important considerations, however point to a
different outcome.
123. Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. 125, at 44-45.

Further, the ar-

chipelagic State may make regulations substantially similar to those enu-

merated in provisions relating to the exclusive economic zone. See note 112
supra. This is contrary to the wishes of the developed countries, who are
seeking international controls. Statement of Mr. J. Stevenson before Subcommittee II of the Seabed Committee, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.7,
at 26 (1972).
124. Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. 128 (4), at 46.

Initially, it must be remembered that several archipelagic nations
have already taken steps, unilaterally, to ensure a degree of sovereignty in the waters surrounding them. In this respect the Negotiating Text must fashion a regime without forcing those States
to retreat too much from positions embodied in their national law.
Absent resolution by the Conference, the issue may indeed be overtaken by events.
Crucially important to evaluating the feasibility of an archipelagic regime is an understanding of the various interests in the
world community generally. This is an age where many traditional
concepts of international law are being called into question. The
developing nations of the world, intent on reaching parity with the
more developed nations, see this Conference as a golden opportunity.
The flavor of the Negotiating Text reflects this attempt to seize
that opportunity. Many sections of the document bend in favor
of the developing nations, from the extension of coastal State jurisdiction generally, to the specified provisions related to control over
those areas.
The regime for archipelagos must be viewed in light of the
tension engendered by this change in circumstances. While once
considered expansive in allowing large areas of sea to become controlled by the archipelagic State, it is now only a reflection of the
greater trend in the recent negotiations. On the other side of the
coin, the reservation of certain rights within archipelagic waters,
i.e., sealanes passage, is but one aspect of the developed nations'
insistence on freedom of navigation. The archipelagic regime is
therefore indicative of a trade-off, a compromise between the
interests of the developing and developed factions.
The foregoing points to the underlying fact that an archipelagic
regime is inextricably bound to a new world order with respect
to the sea. The ultimate success or failure of the archipelagic
regime therefore hinges upon agreement in many other aspects of
the negotiations. To that extent nothing is certain. But given the
impetus of a growing number of unilateral claims and a present
consensus on the necessity of a unified law of the sea, the probabilities are in favor of a regime for archipelagos. Should a regime
be established, its provisions, in all likelihood, will bear a substantial similarity to those discussed herein.
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